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Abstract
The evolution of opinions in a population of individuals who con-
stantly interact with a common source of user-generated content (i.e.
the internet) and are also subject to propaganda is analyzed using
computer simulations. The model is based on the bounded confidence
approach. In the absence of propaganda, computer simulations show
that the online population as a whole is either fragmented, polarized or
in perfect harmony on a certain issue or ideology depending on the un-
certainty of individuals in accepting opinions not closer to theirs. On
applying the model to simulate radicalization, a proportion of the on-
line population, subject to extremist propaganda radicalize depending
on their pre-conceived opinions and opinion uncertainty. It is found
that an optimal counter propaganda that prevents radicalization is
not necessarily centrist.
1 Introduction
Individuals not only consume information from mass media such as televi-
sion, radio, newspapers etc. but also create information and communicate
through the world wide web (see illustration Fig.1 ). Information diffusing
through this system strongly influences the opinion formation mechanism
of an individual depending on how uncertain the individual is, regarding
his or her current opinion on a certain issue. Depending on this uncer-
tainty, individuals tend to accept or avoid opinions that confirm or contra-
dict their respective pre-conceived opinions. This is a characteristic of a
major cognitive bias, the confirmation bias [Nickerson, 1998]. Moreover, an
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individual or groups of individuals can be targeted with a certain propa-
ganda to specifically influence their opinions to satisfy a certain monetary
or an ideological objective. While propaganda aimed at an individual or
groups of individuals to sell a certain product for monetary gain is an ac-
ceptable common marketing strategy [Cialdini, 2001], ideological propaganda
such as that of ISIS (e.g. [Berger and Morgan, 2015]) aimed at radicaliza-
tion to violent extremism poses a grave threat to the safety and security of
the population [Borum, 2011]. While it is impossible to completely elimi-
nate such extremist propaganda, there has been intense activity on develop-
ing counter-narratives to counter such extremist propaganda [Thomas, 2009,
Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011, Bjelopera, 2012, Watts, 2015, Ferguson, 2016].
Facebook
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blog
youtube
comments 
section
Figure 1: Individuals interacting (and influencing each other) through the
internet by accessing and creating content (black squares). Shown also is
individuals accessing propaganda (circles).
In this paper, the opinion dynamics of a certain population of individuals
active online and are subject to a certain extremist propaganda is investigated
and the effects of various counter-narratives (opinions) analyzed. The model
proposed in this paper is based on the ’Bounded Confidence’ method (BCM)
[Deffuant et al., 2000, Hegselmann and Krause, 2002, Deffuant et al., 2002],
that simulates opinion dynamics in populations within the framework of ’so-
ciophysics’ [Galam, 2004] (See [Castellano et al., 2009] for an overview on
various paradigms for modeling opinion dynamics).
Of interest in these models is the overall behavior of a certain popula-
tion of several individuals (or agents) that interact with each other according
to certain pre-defined rules of interaction specified at the level of the indi-
vidual. Characteristic of BCM is a) a mapping of the individuals’ opinions
on a continuous scale between extremes and b) they influence each other if
and only if the ’distance’ between their opinions is smaller than a certain
threshold value of uncertainty (characterized by a parameter that bounds
the confidence level on their current opinion), See [Lorenz, 2007] for a re-
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view of BCM. The earliest work on simulating opinion dynamics within the
framework of BCM goes back to the work of [Hegselmann and Krause, 2002,
Deffuant et al., 2002, Deffuant, 2006]. They investigated the role of extrem-
ists and the variation of the uncertainties of the population on the over-
all opinion dynamics. The dynamic was governed by pair-wise interactions
of individuals who modify their opinions depending on a certain function
of the individual uncertainties. The function that relates the uncertainties
and the opinions can also be designed to reflect the emotions associated
with the opinions [Sobkowicz, 2015]. However, assuming fixed uncertain-
ties, [Mathias et al., 2016] showed that emergence of fluctuating opinions of
moderates for large uncertainties. Using BCM and assuming that a certain
proportion of individuals are anti-conformist, [Weisbuch, 2015] incorporate
the anti-conformist model of [Smaldino and Epstein, 2015] into the BCM to
investigate appropriate conditions conducive for extremism even if the ini-
tial opinions of all the individuals are moderate. Similar in scope is the
model proposed by [Fan and Pedrycz, 2015] based on social judgment the-
ory, wherein in addition to compromise of similar opinions that lie within
the uncertainty threshold, repulsion of opinions that are highly dissimilar is
considered. These interactions of opinions on a continuous space is combined
with discrete choices to take into consideration how individuals perceive the
opinions of others. With regards to propaganda, [Carletti et al., 2006] in-
vestigated conditions under which propaganda modifies the opinions using
BCM.
Inspired by the aforementioned models and subscribing to the philosophy
of keeping things as simple as possible, the proposed model assumes that the
uncertainties of all individuals are uniform and constant. The interaction of
the individuals is not pair-wise but random. In essence, this is more suited
to the situation where individuals online, access information that reflects the
opinion of others instead of actual inter-personal contact. The opinion update
is simultaneous and done in parallel. The model is elaborated in detail in the
next section. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Following the
model description, the results of three computational experiments on opinion
formation with and without propaganda are presented. Finally, a discussion
and interpretation of the results and conclusions provided.
2 Model
Let O =
⋃N
i=1 oi be the set of all opinions in a certain virtual population con-
sisting of N individuals. Irrespective of the issue under debate, the individual
opinions are assumed to be distributed continuously between two extremes.
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In our case, these extreme opinions are assumed to be oE− = 0 and oE+ = 1
such that all opinions in O are equal to or lie between these limits. The opin-
ions oi = 0.5 are assumed to be a moderate (centrist) opinion. Assuming the
initial opinions in O are randomly distributed, the temporal evolution O(t)
of the opinions are influenced by interactions among the individual opinions
in the population and/or subject to a certain set P =
⋃Np
k=1 opk of Np external
propaganda. It is also assumed that the individuals in the population do not
influence the set of propaganda P.
The mechanism of influence of individual opinions on each other is based
on a certain available heuristic, the confirmation bias in human decision
making. The individuals in the population are only influenced by opinions
that are ’close-enough’ to their pre-existing opinion characterized by a cer-
tain threshold u, i.e. if an individual at time t with a certain opinion oi(t)
accesses the opinion oj(t) of another individual in the population through
online interactions i.e reading a Facebook post, twitter post or a comment
on one of the multitude of discussion or comment sections online (see Fig.1),
then the individual modifies his opinion and at discrete future time becomes
oi(t + 1) = oi + wij(oj(t)− oi(t)), if and only if the magnitude of the difference
in opinions dij = |oi − oj| < u. If this is not the case, the opinion of the indi-
vidual is not affected, oi(t + 1) = oi(t). The manner in which the individuals
access each others’ opinion is assumed to be random.
To model the the influence of a certain propaganda opk ∈ P on the indi-
viduals’ opinions in the population, the opinion oi(t) is now modified at time
t + 1 as oi(t + 1) = oi(t) + wipk (opk − oi(t)) if and only if dipk = |oi − opk| < up.
Here up is the threshold value below which the propaganda can influence a
certain individual whose opinion distance to the propaganda is dipk . Fig.2
illustrates all the parameters involved in the model.
The threshold u can be interpreted as a certain characteristic of the whole
population with regards to how flexible the individual is in modifying his pre-
existing opinion or how uncertain the individual is, about his or her current
opinion. This can range from u = 0 for individuals who would not change
their pre-existing opinion no-matter what, to u = 5 for individuals who accept
opinions that are extreme to their current opinion. The weights are chosen
as wij = wipk i.e. the individual at each discrete time increment averages
his opinion with that of the content he is accessing online (user-generated)
and all external propaganda. The weights must satisfy wij +
∑
k wipk = 1.
Let wij = wipk =
1
2+Np
with Np denoting the number of propaganda. At each
discrete time step, if a certain opinion is within the uncertainty of the indi-
viduals’ current opinion, then the individual averages his opinion with that
of the accessed opinion.
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Figure 2: The opinion space 0 ≤ o ≤ 1 and the corresponding color code that
is used in this paper. Illustrated is all the relevant parameters that influence
an opinion oi who has randomly accessed an opinion oj in the presence of two
propaganda, an extremist propaganda op1 = 1 and a propaganda op2 = 0.2
assuming up = 0.1 and u = 0.2. Here, oi is only influenced by op1 .
Having adequately developed all the components of the model, the gen-
eralized equation for opinion update that is applied in parallel to all opinions
in O consisting of N individuals subject to k propaganda taking into account
mutual interactions characterized by the thresholds u and upk is given by:
oi(t + 1) = oi(t) + wij(oj(t)− oi(t))H [u− dij] +
Np∑
k=1
wipk(opk − oi(t))H [up − dipk ]
(1)
The Heaviside step function, H in Eq.(1) is defined as follows:
H[n] =
{
0 n ≤ 0
1 n > 0
(2)
2.1 The population-parameter space
All the results of the computational experiments in this paper will be illus-
trated using the population parameter space. For a certain parameter that
could be the state of the opinions after a certain number of discrete time
steps t or a certain uniform threshold value u or a certain propaganda upk ,
the set of all opinions O is first sorted from 0 to 1 in increasing values and
color-coded according to the legend shown in Fig.2.
3 Computational Experiments
In all the computational experiments presented in this paper the population
N = 25000 individuals and are subject to a maximum of 2 propaganda, op1
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and op2 . A fixed extremist propaganda with op1 = 1 and a variable propa-
ganda 0 ≤ op2 ≤ 1 with up = 1.
3.1 Opinions of a population as a result of online in-
teractions
The first simulation is regarding the long-term opinion formation of a popula-
tion with 25000 individuals whose initial opinion is assumed to be randomly
distributed. The population is not subject to any external propaganda. Fig.3
shows maps of 3 random realizations of the long-term opinions (convergent
opinions after a certain time) of the population as a function of the opinion
uncertainty. Depending on the uncertainty, seen is the development and for-
mation of homogeneous sub-clusters with a uniform opinion i.e. formation
of groups of individuals who subscribe to a uniform opinion. The number of
clusters is inversely proportional to the uncertainty u. There is no novelty in
these predictions as these results are already well known albeit for a slightly
different pair-wise interaction. For u >≈ 0.26, there is a single cluster with
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Figure 3: Map of the proportion of opinions in a population. Shown is the
influence of the uncertainty parameter u on the steady state opinions of 25000
individuals with an initial random distribution of opinions (For color code
refer to Fig.2).
uniform consensus. Not visually discernible is a very small negligible propor-
tion of extremists for u > 0.26. If the population is uncertain on a certain
issue, without any propaganda, assuming idealized interactions described in
the previous section, there is consensus of opinion and this opinion is mod-
erate. The majority of the population is in harmony except for a very small
proportion of fringe elements that hold extreme opinions. For smaller un-
certainties, the population is polarized on the same issue keeping all other
factors constant. For smaller uncertainties there is a fragmentation of opin-
ions into 3, 4, 8 ... etc. sub-clusters. The type of opinion is denoted by the
color whose details are provided in Fig.2.
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3.2 Opinions of a population as a result of online in-
teractions with extremist propaganda
In the second simulation, the influence of one extremist propaganda on the
long-term opinion formation in the population is taken into consideration.
As in the first simulation, the strength of the population is 25000 and the
initial opinion of the population is assumed to be randomly distributed. The
propaganda is assumed to subscribe to the opinion op1 = 1 i.e. an extremist
opinion (e.g. hate preachers, ISIS propaganda etc...). Two special cases are
considered:
1. In case 1, the extremist propaganda targets individuals with opinions
oi ≥ 0.95
2. In case 2, the extremist propaganda targets individuals with opinions
oi ≥ 0.9
In practical terms, case 2 propaganda can be interpreted as being more ef-
ficient than case 1, i.e. an individual with an opinion o = 0.92 will not be
influenced by the propaganda according to case 1 but will be influenced by
the propaganda according to case 2. 3 random realizations of the map of
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Figure 4: Map of the proportion of opinions in a population with extremist
propaganda (case 1) Shown is the influence of the uncertainty parameter on
the long term opinions of 25000 individuals with an initial random distribu-
tion of opinions (For color code refer to Fig.2).
the long term opinions according to case 1 is shown in Fig.4. In contrast to
the predictions in Fig.3, there is a certain range of uncertainties of the pop-
ulation 0 ≤ u < 0.15 wherein there is a formation of a cluster of individuals
with a uniform extremist opinion. This is to be expected in the presence
of extremist propaganda. According to case 2, (See Fig.5) there is an even
larger range of uncertainties that allow for the formation of a uniform cluster
of extremist opinions consistent with that of the propaganda. The overall
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proportion of extremists with opinions consistent with that of the propa-
ganda are higher for case 2 than for case 1. In case 2, as seen in Fig,5, the
proportion of extremists is constant with a value of 10% of the total popu-
lation until the uncertainty of the population is 0.1. As the uncertainty of
the population increases, the proportion of extremists doubles to about 20%
and at around u=0.25±0.2 there is instability that shows either complete
drop in the proportion of extremists to 0% (see Fig.5 left and middle) or a
dramatic rise in the proportion of extremists to about 50% of the population
(see Fig.5 right). For a population uncertainty of about u=0.25±0.2, the
proportion of extremists is unpredictable. Anything is possible. Either 50%
of the population become extremist or extremism is completely rooted out
of the population. To provide a definitive origin for this instability is be-
yond the scope of this paper (see also [Hegselmann and Krause, 2015]). For
uncertainties greater that u = 0.275, there is overall consensus with a small
proportion of extremists.
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Figure 5: Map of the proportion of opinions in a population with extremist
propaganda (case 2). Shown is the influence of the uncertainty parame-
ter on the long term opinions of 25000 individuals with an initial random
distribution of opinions showing unstable behavior around the population
uncertainty range 0.23 < u < 0.24 (For color code refer to Fig.2)
3.3 Opinions of a population as a result of online in-
teractions with, an extremist propaganda and a
counter-propaganda
In the final simulation, in addition to an extremist propaganda with op1 = 1,
the long term opinions of individuals in the population taking into account
online interactions and a counter-propaganda 0 ≤ op2 ≤ 1 is considered. Of
interest is the effect of this counter propaganda and its opinion op2 on the
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proportion of extremists in the population as a function of the population
uncertainty.
Figs.6, 7 and 8 show the map of the long-term opinions for various uncer-
tainties u and various counter-propaganda op2 . For u = 0, according to Fig.6
(left), shows a constant proportion (10%) of extremists irrespective of the
target propaganda op for op < 0.9. For op > 0.9, there is a a sudden increase
in the proportion of extremists to 20% of the total population that linearly
decreases to 10% of the total population. The opinion space is highly frag-
mented as expected from the assumption u = 0. A similar trend regarding
the proportion of extremists is observed in Fig.6(middle) for u = 0.1 except
that the overall population is fragmented into clusters in terms of opinions.
For larger uncertainty, u = 0.15, there is a) less fragmentation of opinions, b)
absence of extremist opinion oi = 0 for op > 0.3 and c) a marginal increase
of extremist opinions at around 25% for op = 0.9 that linearly decreases to
≈ 10%. However, just before op = 0.9 there is almost 50% decrease in the
number of extremists before a drastic rise in the extremist proportion. This
effect is observed in a much more amplified manner for u = 0.15, u = 0.2 and
u = 0.25 depicted in Fig.7,(left, middle and right) respectively. The opinions
in general are a mix of fragmentation and polarization with extremists.
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Figure 6: Map of the influence of the target propaganda op2 in the presence
of propaganda op1 = 1 on the steady state opinions of 25000 individuals with
an initial uniform distribution of opinions with extremist propaganda with
up = 0.1 for three different uncertainties of the population. Left: u = 0,
middle:u = 0.05 and right: u = 0.1 (For color code refer to Fig.2)
Of significance is the absence of extremists at around op2 ≈ 0.85 for u = 0.25,
u = 0.2 and also for u = 0.15 but only for a much smaller range of op2 . Such
an absence of extremists is also found for op2 ≈ 0.25 for u = 0.25 and u = 0.3
as seen in Figs.7(right) and Figs.8(left). For large values of population uncer-
tainties, u = 3.5, and u = 0.4, there is predominant consensus for the com-
plete range of op2 with the consensus of the majority swaying between mod-
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erate opinions.
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Figure 7: Map of the influence of the target propaganda op2 in the presence
of propaganda op1 = 1 on the steady state opinions of 25000 individuals with
an initial uniform distribution of opinions with extremist propaganda with
up = 0.1 for three different uncertainties of the population. Left: u = 0.15,
middle:u = 0.2 and right: u = 0.25 (For color code refer to Fig.2)
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Figure 8: Map of the influence of the target propaganda op2 in the presence
of propaganda op1 = 1 on the steady state opinions of 25000 individuals with
an initial uniform distribution of opinions with extremist propaganda with
up = 0.1 for three different uncertainties of the population. Left: u = 0.3,
middle:u = 0.35 and right: u = 0.4 (For color code refer to Fig.2)
All the results so far have been long-term opinions that have converged
to a constant opinion after several iterations of Eq.1. Fig.9 shows the tempo-
ral evolution of opinions with an initial random distribution for the case of
u = 0.25 for op2 = 0.2 (left), op2 = 0.5 (middle) and op2 = 0.8 (right). For the
same population uncertainty, as already seen within the context of the long-
term opinion formation, the propaganda op2 = 0.2 shown in Fig.9 (left), and
op2 = 0.8 Fig.9 (right) eliminate extremism completely from the population
even with extremist propaganda of similar strength. However, for a propa-
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ganda op2 = 0.5 depicted in Fig.9(middle) shows an increase in extremism in
time.
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Figure 9: Map of the temporal evolution of opinions for op2 = 0.29 (left),
op2 = 0.5 (middle) and op2 = 0.8 (right) in the presence of extremist propa-
ganda op1 = 1 for 25000 individuals with an initial random distribution of
opinions assuming the population uncertainty u = 0.25 (For color code refer
to Fig.2)
4 Discussion
In the first computational experiment the long term-opinion formation in the
population is dependent on the initial opinion and the uniform uncertainty of
the population. The opinions of individuals in the population is influenced by
online interactions (e.g. opinionated creation and access of content online).
The major observation is the formation of clusters, i.e. groups of individuals
with the same opinions. The number of clusters depends on the uncertainty
of the population. High uncertainties generate consensus in the population
whose opinion is that of a center/moderate opinion while low uncertainties
support the formation of multiple groups ranging the complete opinion space.
Assuming the population to have a uniform uncertainty can be argued to be
an oversimplification but it can be interpreted as a common trait of the
population. We can conclude that it is desirable that the population have
high levels of uncertainty in opinion regarding a certain issue to avoid conflict.
In the second computational experiment, an external extreme propaganda
was introduced as an additional source of influence on the long-term opin-
ion of the population. The extremist propaganda is targeted at the extreme
individuals in the population. Depending on the population uncertainty,
through online interactions, these extreme individuals constantly influenced
by extreme propaganda can influence other individuals in the population.
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Clearly, even if the propaganda is aimed at a certain section of the popula-
tion, the uncertainty of the population and the presence of online interactions
can influence the rest of the population. While the extreme propaganda is
the source, the online interaction acts as a tool to spread this extreme pro-
paganda. The strength of the propaganda was also investigated, showing a
proportional influence on the long term extremist proportions in the popula-
tion. The most interesting result according to Fig.5 is that of the complete
absence of extremists in the population for a certain narrow range of popu-
lation uncertainty.
The final experiment can be interpreted as a scenario wherein a certain
agency wants to find out which is the optimal counter strategy to eliminate
or curb extremist opinions in a certain population in constant online in-
teractions and are subject to a certain extremist propaganda. Such counter
measures are crucial to curb violent extremism committed by certain individ-
uals holding radical extremist opinions. Within this context, the simulations
evidently show that there is indeed certain ranges of opinions that in terms
of propaganda can actually counter extremist propaganda by reducing the
number of individuals that subscribe to extremist opinions. These counter
propaganda, according to computational simulations show that it is indeed
not a moderate opinion but an opinions that lies midway in-between ex-
treme and moderate opinions depending on the uniform uncertainty of the
population.
5 Conclusion
The opinion dynamics of an ideal population subject to propaganda is sim-
ulated using numerical computations. The computational model is based on
the bounded confidence approach. In the absence of propaganda, individuals
with diverse initial opinions modify their opinions due to mutual interac-
tions. The change in opinion is based on their uncertainty (i.e the distance
of an opinion from his/her current opinion that the individual is ready to
compromise with) with regard to the issue. Depending on this uncertainty,
the population is fragmented and in conflict for low uncertainties or develop
consensus for large uncertainties. In the presence of an external extremist
propaganda aimed at the extreme elements in this population, mutual inter-
actions within the population can transform non-extremist individuals into
ones that hold extremist opinions. To counter this extremist propaganda,
a counter-propaganda with various opinions (’narratives’) was introduced
showing that the most optimal counter-strategy to curb individual opinion
shift to extremism is neither the complete opposite nor a centrist propaganda.
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